Overview of the special issue
Corporate Governance: An International Review (CGIR) was founded in 1992. Over the past twenty years, this journal has grown in reach and stature as the world has come to understand the pivotal role of corporate governance within the global economy. Over these two decades, its central mission remains the same: ‘To develop a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance.’ To commemorate its first twenty years, we will be holding a special conference focused on national governance bundles and publishing a subsequent special issue of the best papers presented at this conference.
National governance bundles are configurations of corporate governance mechanisms that simultaneously operate on the firm- and national-levels to govern firms within an overall economy or collection of economies. Previous studies of corporate governance bundles have only examined firm-level complementarities of corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Hoskisson, Castleton & Withers, 2009; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Ward, Brown & Rodriguez, 2009) with limited consideration of the national context. Previous studies of national governance systems have compared ‘Coordinated Market Economies’ with ‘Liberal Market Economies’ (Hall & Soskice, 2000), “Anglo-American,” “Communitarian,” and “Emerging” economies (Millar, Eldomaty, Choi & Hilton, 2005), and “Market-Oriented” against “Network-Oriented” systems (Weimar & Pape, 1999) with limited consideration of firm-level governance mechanisms. Unfortunately, these two promising streams of research have yet to converge and inform each other (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Jackson & Gospell, 2008).
The aim of this conference and subsequent special issue is to move the field closer to a global theory by advancing our understanding of national governance bundles, which combines insights from the literature on firm governance bundles with insights from the national governance systems literature. Ideally, the conference will yield conceptual and empirical studies of a limited number of configurations of national governance bundles to refine and extend the field’s thinking about how corporate governance mechanisms complement or substitute for each other.
Professors Christina Ahmadjian, Hitotsubashi University; Igor Filatotchev, Cass Business School, City University London; Randall Morck, University of Alberta; and Eduardo Schiehll, HEC-Montreal will serve as distinguished guest editors for this focused issue on national governance bundles.
Types of submissions desired
In this conference and special issue, we are seeking both empirically-based taxonomies and conceptually-derived typologies of national governance bundles. Armed with these taxonomies/typologies, the field of international corporate governance can move closer to a global theory by enabling “mid-range” theories within and across these configurations. These taxonomies and/or typologies should include salient firm- and national-level corporate governance mechanisms such as: laws and regulations, social norms and cultural values, the market for corporate control, ownership rights and responsibilities, executive compensation systems, accounting systems, information and disclosure, and board structures and processes. Of course, we welcome studies that consider antecedents and contextual determinants of these bundles as well as governance outcomes, but these are not required. Historical perspectives and/or case studies, similar to Morck (2007), are particularly welcome.
The conference will be held in Cambridge, England, on 28-29 September 2012. The co-sponsors of this conference will be the University of Cambridge Judge Business School and Wiley-Blackwell, the publisher of CGIR. The conference will occur over a two-day period (Friday afternoon and all day Saturday). The conference will be coordinated by the Conference Manager and Gishan Dissanaike, Adam Smith Professor of Corporate Governance at Cambridge Judge Business School.
Scholars who wish to participate in this conference can submit 300-600 word structured abstracts to [email protected] by 1 July 2012. These abstracts will be processed and decisions will be issued by 15 July 2012. If the presenter would like to submit a full paper for consideration for publication in the special issue, then these papers must be presented at the conference and be submitted to CGIR’s online submission system by 1 September 2012.
Aguilera, R., Filatotchev, I., Jackson, G. and Gospell, H. (2008) “An organizational approach to comparative corporate governance: costs, contingencies, and complementarities.” Organization Science, 19: 475-492
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. (2000) Varieties of capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hoskisson, R.E., Castleton, M. and Withers, M. (2009) “Complementarity in monitoring and bonding: more intense monitoring leads to higher executive compensation.” Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(2): 57-74
Millar, C., Eldomaty, T., Choi, C. and Hilton, B. (2005) “Corporate governance and institutional transparency in emerging markets.” Journal of Business Ethics, 59: 163-183
Morck, R.K. (ed.) (2007) A history of corporate governance around the world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rediker, K. and Seth, A. (1995) “Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms.” Strategic Management Journal, 16(2): 85-99
Ward, A., Brown, J. and Rodriguez, D. (2009) “Governance bundles, firm performance, and the substitutability and complementarity of governance mechanisms.” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 646-660
Weimer, J. and Pape, J. (1999) “A taxonomy of systems of corporate governance.” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 7: 152-166
The Cambridge Corporate Governance Network (CCGN) is a confederation of University of Cambridge faculties, research centres and academics interested in corporate governance. The network spans the Faculties of Law and Economics, and Cambridge Judge Business School.